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Abstract. An extensive body of research documents how governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats.
Varying explanations have been offered, most of which touch upon the liabilities of policy responsibility.
Although media coverage is generally acknowledged as one of these liabilities, few empirical studies have
examined how news content affect government support. Based on the fact that voters get their information
about politics, policies and societal issues from the media, this article studies how the constant stream of
negative news influences incumbent support over a 20-year period in Denmark. Modeling a previously
untested argument on the cost of ruling, it shows that the accumulation of bad news throughout tenure
exerts a substantial effect on government support.
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Introduction
In one of the early examinations of the electoral fortunes of incumbents, Rose and Mackie
(1983) begin with a simple question: Are winners losers? Their own comprehensive and
comparative analyses provide a clear answer, revealing how incumbency is more likely to
be a liability than an asset. Subsequent research has reinforced this notion across time and
countries, making the so-called ‘cost of ruling’ – the negative incumbency effect – one of
the most well-established findings in political science (Wlezien 2016; Cuzan 2015). In other
words, governing parties lose votes. Studies have estimated that, on average, elections cost
incumbents between 1.6 and 2.5 per cent of their vote share (Paldam 1986; Nannestad &
Paldam 1999; Narud & Valen 2008; Stevenson 2002; Wlezien 2016), and the size of this
electoral wear increases with their tenure in office (cf.Nannestad & Paldam 1999; Stevenson
2002;Wlezien 2016).
Although we know that winners tend to become losers, we know less about why. This
article puts forward and tests the argument that bad news accumulates over tenure,gradually
eroding the electoral support for government.Our basic expectation is that news tone affects
the public’s perception of and support for the government. More particularly, we argue
that a constant stream of negative news images causes an increasing congestion of ‘bad
memories’ that is an important driver of the cost of ruling. This congestion is an implied
but unexplored aspect of existing theoretical perspectives on why government vote loss
increases with the length of tenure. Negative media coverage sometimes figures as one
of the liabilities of office (e.g., Rose & Mackie 1983: 119–121; Green & Jennings 2016:
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138–139),but focused theoretical attention and systematic empirical investigation have been
lacking.
The tendency to emphasise negative developments is a well-known characteristic or
news value of the media (Harcup & O’Neill 2001; Shoemaker 2006). We make no
assumptions about the specific sources or causes of news negativity (e.g., it is not our
intention to pin negativity on journalistic framing alone) and we make no attempt to
distinguish between some sort of objective (negative or positive) reality and the framing
given to stories in the news. We are simply interested in how the information available
to voters through the news affects their support for government. Important in our
approach to news tone is the inherently political nature of news in the sense that its
content is usually more favourable to some actors than others (Green-Pedersen et al.
2017). This is particularly the case when studying politics from a government-opposition
perspective. Obviously, most people will view news about increases in hospital queues or
unemployment as negative, but in the context of party competition, such news stories play
to the disadvantage of those in charge of policy making much more than they hurt the
opposition.
Utilising a dataset on daily news coverage over a 20-year period in Denmark, we show
how governments with the same tenure, struggling with comparable economic conditions,
experience different degrees of vote loss according to the accumulated balance of positive
and negative news images during tenure.
Why are winners losers?
Although we know that governing parties lose votes and that the cost of ruling has increased
in recent decades (Narud & Valen 2007), there is still a limited body of research that
successfully explains why governments lose votes over time. Admittedly, there is a large,
strong literature on vote and popularity (VP) functions that is of interest to this discussion.
Many VP studies focus on how the development of the economy (or perceptions thereof)
affects government popularity and how governments try to influence their own support by
manipulating the economy (cf. Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000). Similar to the cost-of-ruling
research VP studies concentrate on government popularity, but the focus in this literature is
on cyclical patterns in government support rather than decline over time. Interestingly, the
VP literature has shown how economic news play a key role in shaping public perceptions
of how the economy is doing (cf. Nadeau et al. 1999). Hetherington’s (1996) seminal study
of the 1992 American presidential campaign, for instance, showed how the media’s negative
framing of the economy contributed to Bush’s defeat. The important role of the news has
thus also been highlighted in this neighbouring literature on government popularity, which
stimulates the idea of the media being a central factor in the steady decline of government
support over election periods.
Returning to the cost of ruling, studies that concentrate on variations across political
systems highlight how the incumbency disadvantage varies according to the concentration
and visibility of policy responsibility (Narud & Valen 2008; Rose & Mackie 1983; Strøm
1990; Powell & Whitten 1993; Palmer & Whitten 2002). Where concentration and visibility
are high, voters can assign blame to the government more easily. This in turn accelerates
and/or strengthens the process by which voters gradually lose faith in incumbents.However,
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this still does not explain the basic finding: that governments – across time and institutional
contexts – (almost) always lose.
Instead of using variation as a starting point, Nannestad and Paldam’s (1999)
comprehensive andmuch-cited review of the cost-of-ruling literature approaches the puzzle
from the observation that the cost of ruling is unusually constant: ‘Therefore it must be
explained by something that is likely to be unusually stable as well’ (Nannestad & Paldam
1999:9). In their effort to explain the cost of ruling byway ofwhat they call a ‘deep parameter
of human behaviour’, they proceed with three theoretical models.The first, based onMueller
(1970),holds that governments face an increasing coalition ofminorities.When governments
make decisions, there is inevitably a losing minority of discontented voters. The longer
a government stays in office, the more decisions it makes. The losing minorities are not
identical every time,meaning that the result is an increasing number of voters who have seen
the government implement policies they do not support.1 Importantly, this happens because
the government made inconsistent and unrealistic promises prior to taking office – in
order to win office. But when entering office these ‘over-promises’ are revealed. The
opposition,on the other hand, can formulate policy alternatives and promises thatmay shine
in comparison to the compromises necessary when they later (after winning) must balance
the state budget. The idea is simple and plausible, but empirical support is nevertheless
lacking (Wlezien 2016).
The second perspective discussed by Nannestad and Paldam is the median-gap theory,
which is based on the notion that party competition in a one-dimensional, left-right issue
space is competition over the median voter (Hotelling 1929). Moreover, it assumes that
parties move policy to their preferred position (left or right) after taking office. Gradually
they thereby lose a proportion of the median voters who give their vote to the opposition
in order to close the median gap and again bring policy closer to their own centrist position.
Stevenson (2002) generalised this theory, showing how policy will growmore extreme (more
to the left or right), and the cost of ruling higher as tenure increases; not because governing
parties become more extreme, but because it takes time to legislate and implement all of
their preferred policies across the many different policy sectors (Wlezien 2016). Again, the
idea is neat and convincing, but empirical evidence has previously been lacking. However,
in his recent analysis of American presidential elections, Wlezien (2016) finds that policy
misrepresentation (based on the median-gap hypothesis) is an important mechanism that
explains part of the cost of ruling.
Nannestad and Paldam’s third contender (and favourite) is grievance asymmetry theory.
The basic story here is the well-known psychological bias that induces an asymmetric
response to negative and positive information (cf. Kernell 1977; Lau 1982; Soroka 2014).
Assuming that voters base their decision on economic developments – a fair assumption
according to the extensive literature on the economic vote – the fact that they over-
emphasise negative changes and under-emphasise positive ones will lead to a cost of ruling.
Even with a better-than-average economy, the grievance asymmetry ensures a vote loss. As
pointed out by Wlezien (2016), however, a problem with this perspective is that in order for
grievance asymmetry theory to explain an increasing cost of ruling, the asymmetry has to
increase over time;moreover, the grievance asymmetry perspective on the cost of ruling has
yet to be tested in empirical research.
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Another potential explanation can be found in the literature on valence politics. Green
and Jennings (2012), for instance, study how the voters’ perception of the government’s issue
competence granger-causes their support for them.While this perspective does not offer an
explanation ofwhy governments would suffer from increasing vote loss over time, in a recent
comparative study, Green and Jennings (2016) address this limitation by concentrating on
how performance evaluations develop over the course of tenure. Their impressive and
comprehensive analyses show how negative performance evaluations have a stronger effect
on government support than do positive evaluations and that the accumulation of negative
judgements exerts a considerable effect on incumbent support: ‘[T]he costs of governing are
a function of the accumulation of blame for poor perceived performance’ (Green& Jennings
2016: 142).
The endogenous nature of the relationship between performance evaluations and vote
intention means that the interpretation of these results is open for debate. The independent
variable of interest in this perspective – evaluations of government performance – comes
very close to the dependent variable – vote intention for the incumbent parties. In fact,
applying a slightly broader definition of the cost of ruling, a decline in performance
evaluations could arguably be included as part of the phenomenon we are trying to
explain. It is nevertheless interesting that the performance judgements are unrelated to
the exogenous performance indicators of incumbents (Green & Jennings 2016), which
begs further questions about what is driving the observed decline in performance
judgements.
Green and Jennings suggest some answers when discussing their assumptions about the
underlying processes that cause performance evaluations to decline. From the perspective
of this articl, it is noteworthy that this discussion concentrates on the information about
government to which voters are exposed. In fact, for the first time in this literature, the role
of the media and negative news is given serious consideration:
One bad news story will be followed by another, then another, and so on. We would
not expect negative performance shocks to dissipate, returning to equilibrium, if they
are stored in public memory in such a significant way and if negativity bias means
they are more attended to and memorised. The accumulation of negative information
will have an additional effect on incumbent party support. It is as though every piece
of bad news reinforces what voters have previously heard. (Green & Jennings 2016:
184)
Green and Jennings’ argument offers a solution to the key challenge when explaining
the cost of ruling. Government vote loss is fairly constant across contexts but at the same
time steadily increasing during tenure, although with some predictable exceptions related
to campaigns and honeymoon periods (cf. Green & Jennings 2016). What is needed in
order to explain the nearly universal presence of incumbency costs and the continuous
increase of vote loss during tenure is an equally universal and equally rising phenomenon
that relates to policy responsibility. Given the importance of media in political life, the
time seems ripe for the idea that news information could provide what the literature has
been lacking thus far – namely an explanation of the cost of ruling that also finds empirical
support.
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Negative news, accumulated grievance and governing costs
There are three steps involved in linking news coverage to the cost-of-ruling phenomenon:
We need to substantiate that news tone (1) influences vote intention, (2) relates to policy
responsibility and (3) is generally more negative than positive, providing the basis for an
accumulation of grievances.
The influence of news tone on vote intention
Developments like the decline of party membership, end of the party press, and the
increasing spread and use of different communicationmediamean that contemporarymedia
institutions are the most important sources of information and channels of communication
between the public and political sphere (cf.Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999;Strömbäck 2008;Esser
& Strömbäck 2014). Combined with the increasing tendency of voters to switch parties, the
role of media in explanations of vote choice would seem to warrant considerable research
attention.
As mentioned above, the role of media has received attention in the extensive literature
on the influence of the economy on government popularity and the VP function. In
the literature on issue ownership, which is ultimately concerned with vote choice, recent
examples of media influence on vote choice can also be found. The news coverage of
issues owned by a given party can increase voter support for that party (Thesen et al. 2017;
Ansolabere & Iyengar 1994; Beyer et al. 2014; Boomgaarden & Vliegenhart 2007;Walgrave
& De Swert 2004). Given that previous research relates the tone of media coverage to the
public’s vote (cf. Hopmann et al. 2010; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2007; Brody 1991; Joslyn &
Ceccoli 1996; Zaller 1996), the assumption that news tone also would influence the cost of
ruling seems reasonable.
News tone and policy responsibility
The second step when turning from vote choice in general to a specific emphasis on
incumbent vote losses is to substantiate that news tone relates to the policy responsibility
of incumbents and that it does so in a negative or critical way. Perspectives and research
on news value theory constitute a natural starting point in this regard. A set of values
exists among journalists that specifies several properties of an event that increase its
‘newsworthiness’ (Harcup & O’Neill 2001; Shoemaker 2006). The combination of the two
news values of elite status/power and negativity clearly establishes a potential link between
news tone and the electoral costs of governing. Regarding the latter value – negativity –
the implication is that negative news and a disproportionate focus on societal problems or
failures dominate the media (Soroka 2012).
Regarding the former value – elite status/power – a number of studies across different
national contexts find that incumbents receive more media coverage than challengers
(Semetko 1996; Hopmann et al. 2011). Incumbents’ decisions can affect nearly all aspects
of society, which increases their relevance as objects of news coverage. In a recent study
of the so-called ‘incumbency bonus’, Green-Pedersen et al. (2017) argue that the media
prominence of government actors is inextricably linked to the watchdog role of the media
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and the burden of being held responsible for all kinds of problems. In other words, contrary
to what the concept implies, the incumbency bonus should not cause an electoral bonus
but rather constitute a liability for the government. Rose and Mackie (1983) describe the
inevitable unpopularity that accompanies office:
In so far as a governing party is human, it will make mistakes. In so far as it is visible,
its mistakes will be well publicized. In so far as it is responsible for all that is done by
government, it will be identified with all the shortcomings of its administration, and
with all the problems of a nation, whether or not its policies are contributing causes or
even mitigating ones. (Rose & Mackie 1983: 119)
Thus, we argue that news tone in general, even when it does not explicitly address
government performance, matters to incumbent support. This is because news stories
provide information about the nature and development of problems in society which,
together with direct and explicit information about government performance, in turn is used
when passing judgement on incumbents.
The news tone is more negative than positive
Third, and finally, if the amount and tone of news should contribute to explaining the steadily
increasing vote loss of governments during tenure, it would require that the dominance
of negative over positive news is relatively stable over time. Should this be the case and
given that news is stored in voter memory (Green & Jennings 2016: 138–139), the result is
that the asymmetry increases steadily during tenure. We provide empirical support for this
assumption in the following, showing that while some news stories are obviously positive,
the news agenda as a whole is always more negative than positive from the incumbent’s
point of view.
Combining the pieces: Bad news accumulation and vote loss
Based on the above discussion, we find it promising to think of the cost of ruling as a
result of two separate processes in political communication. First, a grievance asymmetry
or negativity bias in the information environment of voters, ensuring a dominance of
negative frames and perspectives from the point of view of government. Second, a grievance
accumulation whereby negative information – all the explicit mishandling, scandals and
mistakes or simply just the unfortunate events and developments outside government
control – is stored in an ever-growing stock of memories that pushes more and more voters
away from the incumbents.
We frame this as a push process through which voters are mainly disappointed by
incumbents rather than attracted to challengers. Naturally, however, there are also pull
elements at play simultaneously, often merely reflecting different sides of the same coin.
In other words, the electoral disadvantages of officeholders have their counterparts in the
strategic advantages enjoyed by the opposition (Rose & Mackie 1983: 119–121). Unlike
governing parties, the reliability of opposition parties is not severely tested. Or in the
words of Nannestad and Paldam (1999: 11), the ‘true policy, Z’ parameter, which voters
need in order to pass judgement on parties, becomes distant from a rational perspective
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where performance is key. As already mentioned, it is easy to offer enticements when,
for the moment, they are merely ideas that need not be negotiated into a budget or a
detailed and concrete policy. Furthermore, opposition parties will usually avoid the same
level of critical media attention to which government is subjected (Green-Pedersen et al.
2017).
In light of the existing literature, our idea builds on and explicitly examines some of
the underlying theoretical arguments about what causes performance evaluations (and thus
incumbent support) to exhibit a steady decrease (Green & Jennings 2016). Furthermore,
our argument provides exactly the cumulative function missing in the grievance asymmetry
theory (Wlezien 2016). A constant stream of ‘bad memories’ to the public results in an
ever-increasing congestion of mistakes, scandals and negative developments that increases
the cost of ruling steadily throughout the duration of tenure. The micro-level foundation
underlying this mechanism is strongly related to theories of retrospective economic voting
and memory studies in political psychology. The former strand of research documents the
importance of prior economic developments to voting behaviour (cf. Duch & Stevenson
2008).Retrospective voting has also been identified in non-economic areas (see an overview
in Healy & Malhotra 2013), which supports our general and broad application of this
assumption. The latter strand of research argues that memory cannot be ignored as a
facilitator of vote choice (cf. Lau & Redlawsk 2006), showing, for instance, that emotion
and negative stimuli have a positive effect on recall (cf. Kensinger & Corkin 2003). While
grievance asymmetry (see above) is certainly also relevant here, note that we do not have
to make any assumptions about how voters weight positive and negative information –
even though this would not work against the theory but rather reinforce the mechanism.
Instead of relying on a deep parameter of human behaviour, we ‘externalise’ the grievance
asymmetry; or rather, the negativity bias inherent to human behaviour also shapes news
institutions and news content, which in turn exert a steady, negative influence on voter
evaluations of government.
Summing up, our main expectation is an accumulation effect: Governments gradually
lose voters over the course of tenure because grievances accumulate in the shape of
negative news. However, in the empirical analysis we also evaluate three alternative
media effects consistent with the general argument about news tone as a driver of
government vote loss. The first is a cost-of-ruling effect stemming from day-to-day media
coverage becoming increasingly negative during government tenure. The second is the
straightforward expectation that it is day-to-day news negativity (not the accumulation of
bad news) that drives the cost of ruling. Finally, the third alternative explanation is that bad
news coverage possibly has a stronger impact as tenure increases, regardless of whether news
actually gets worse over tenure.
Research design and data
When examining the link between news tone and the cost of ruling, we make use of
a comprehensive dataset combining monthly opinion polls with daily news coverage
from 1984–2003 in Denmark. Similar to most European proportional representation
systems, Denmark has a multiparty system. Party competition in Denmark is nevertheless
characterised by two blocs of parties – one on the left, the other on the right – providing
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clear government alternatives (Green-Pedersen & Thomsen 2005). This is, of course, a
simplification of the dynamics of the Danish multiparty system, but also a reminder
that our study bears relevance for similar multiparty systems and the two-party
context.
That said, there are institutional characteristics that affect the clarity of responsibility
in a political system and which therefore possibly matter to the cost of ruling (Powell &
Whitten 1993; Palmer & Whitten 2002; Wlezien 2016). The attribution of responsibility is
made easier by the type of direct control over policy offered in a parliamentary system such
as Denmark. Conversely, a high number of parties, strong opposition influence and, most
importantly, frequent multiparty minority coalitions – often with no dominant party at the
median – work in the opposite direction (Gallagher et al. 2006; Schofield 1995; Heidar &
Rasch 2017). In addition, although Denmark is a unitary state, much of the implementation
of especially welfare policies is decentralised to the local and regional levels of government,
just as European Union regulation also affects Denmark and thus also limits the clarity
of responsibility. Overall, then, Denmark should in theory be a relatively hard case when
identifying the cost-of-ruling phenomenon given that a number of institutional features
make policy responsibility less concentrated and visible. We return to this question in the
conclusion in light of the empirical results.
With respect to the news media, Denmark is a typical example of Hallin and Mancini’s
(2004) democratic corporatist media system (Allern & Blach-Ørsten 2011). Yet the
theoretical argument of this article is very general, suggesting that the scope of the findings
should not be restricted to the context of northern Europe. Different media systems
generally fulfil the two key assumptions of our argument: Politics is mediatised in the
sense that voters receive their information about performance and policies from the media,
as noted above (Strömbäck 2008), and news content is largely negative (Soroka 2014).
Obviously, the tone of news might differ across systems due to, for instance, variations
in the strength of public service broadcasting and the degree of commercialisation and
competition in the media market, as documented by Esser et al. (2017). Nevertheless, from
the perspective of our case selection, the most important aspect is that ‘the evidence of
negativity across countries is a consequence of a certain universality in the negativity bias,
for humans, and for journalists as well’ (Soroka 2014: 94). We therefore argue that our
assumptions and explanations most likely should translate rather easily to other media
systems.
Measuring the dependent variable
The dependent variable – government support – was measured using data on party support
for the period from 1984–2003, based on monthly Gallup surveys.2 For each month, the vote
intentions for parties in office were aggregated, thereby forming the dependent variable of
monthly vote intention for incumbents. In other words, we do not use electoral results as
a measure of the cost of ruling, but instead make use of polls to capture the continuous
development of electoral sentiment between elections (Jennings &Wlezien 2016). Figure 1
shows the over-time development in both absolute support for government parties as well
as month-to-month changes in support.
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Figure 1. Government support, level and first-differenced, Denmark, 1984–2003. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Opinion polls are not election results, and one could imagine either that the cost of
ruling is the result of a campaign dynamic or that the government is able to regain during
the campaign what is lost in everyday politics. As shown by Jennings and Wlezien (2016),
however,polls are a strong predictor of election results and increasingly sowhen the polls are
close in time to the election.To exclude the possibility that the cost of ruling first of all relates
to campaign dynamics,we compared the vote intention from the start of each campaign with
the final vote, finding no consistent pattern.3 Consequently, if we are to better understand
governing costs, we must look beyond campaigns and elections.
Measuring the main independent variable
The news tone is measured drawing on data from Danish radio news in the period
1984–2003. The radio news was produced by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR),
which in this period enjoyed a de facto monopoly on broadcasting radio news and had
an audience of approximately one million listeners in a country with some five million
citizens. From the perspective of other news sources and those not listening to radio news,
studies of the Danish media system have found these broadcasts to be an important link
between the agenda of morning papers and evening television news (Lund 2002). The
DR broadcasts are therefore arguably a sound and efficient means by which to measure
the news content experienced by the Danish electorate during the period of investigation.
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Moreover, the Danish radio news broadcasts have never been seen as having a particular
party-political colour, which probably reflects the limited tradition for ‘self-made’ stories.
The news database contains all of the features from the long version of the daily radio news
broadcast at noon (just over 58,000 items). The noon broadcast was typically considered the
most important due to its impact on television news later in the day, and it had the most
listeners.
The news tone of each feature was coded.As discussed in the introduction, this article is
based on a political understanding of news tone. By this we mean whether the news is good
or bad from the incumbent’s perspective. The reason is that we study news tone in order to
explain the cost of ruling as opposed to examining whether or not themedia portray ‘reality’
in a way that is negatively biased (e.g., Soroka 2012). While there are obviously different
sources of negativity in the news, we are neither interested in nor able to distinguish them
in the current study.
To operationalise the idea of the news tone from a political perspective, the tone of each
news feature was coded into four categories: neutral, negative, positive or un-codable. The
codingwas based on short resumes of the news features.4 Some of these resumeswere simply
too short to code the tone, which was then categorised as ‘un-codable’. The main coding
rule reflects our distinct political perspective on media tone, where the news is evaluated
on the basis of how it relates to government responsibility and the opposition-government
competition (see examples in Table A1 in the Online Appendix).
Using the viewpoint of government ministers as our starting point, typical negative
stories include news about increasing inflation, industry closures, crime, accidents, spread
of new diseases and so on. However, stories where the government might be content with
a specific policy but nevertheless met by criticism also qualify as bad news. The assumption
is that the minister in charge would have preferred different news content or no story at
all. Furthermore, the opposition-versus-government perspective also means that we have
coded internal disagreement within the government, together with media attention to the
opposition (unless critical of the opposition), as negative. For the most part, neutral stories
cover news that provides a reasonably balanced portrayal of an issue, such as highlighting
both something negative and something positive.However,news that does not communicate
any clear evaluation or that is lacking relevance to politics has also been coded as neutral.
The central point is that the judgement on the tone of the news is based on a political
perspective on media-politics relations: Is this news feature good, bad or neutral for the
incumbent government (Green-Pedersen et al. 2017)?5
It is also important to emphasise that our coding of news tone is not limited to stories in
which government actors are explicitly mentioned.Although news stories that, for instance,
blame incumbents are clearly negative (and coded accordingly),our argument is also built on
the assumption that policy responsibility links government actors to societal developments
– even when they themselves do not figure in the news.6 In other words, news about industry
closures, environmental disasters, crime waves and so on are coded negative, even without
any government presence in the respective stories.
Note that we included some additional layers in the coding to get closer to our theoretical
variable. For instance, when the news item attributes blame or criticism to a previous
government, this would not be coded as a negative news item. Furthermore, if a news story
contains government criticism but the criticism is re-directed or countered by a third party,
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Figure 2. News tone balance, month by month and cumulated, Denmark, 1984–2003. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
the item would not be coded as negative. On the other hand, if the criticism is redirected
or answered only by the incumbents themselves, then it has been registered as negative.
The latter coding rule reflects the assumption that incumbents will (almost) always meet
negative news with blame-shifting or blame-avoidance statements, but such statements are
nevertheless responses that do not remove the initial negative attention (see alsoHood et al.
2009).7
All of the analyses reported below have been performed on a dataset where the news
features were aggregated into monthly observations, summing to a total of 240 months in
the 20-year period (see Table A2 in the Online Appendix for descriptions of news tone
and Figure A1 for the distribution of stories over time). Our measure of news tone is
simply based on first subtracting the amount of negative news in a given month from the
amount of positive news in the same month. This arguably constitutes a valid measure of
the theoretical argument as it relates directly to the balance between negative and positive
news images while at the same time capturing the extent of the negativity bias.Next, in order
to capture the idea about accumulated news asymmetry or grievances, the news tone balance
or asymmetry is summed consecutively (as a running tally) for every month the incumbent
has been in office. Figure 2 shows both the month-to-month variation in the news balance
measure as well as the cumulated news balance measure. As seen in the figure, the size of
the negativity bias varies from month to month, but the general pattern is clearly one of an
overweight of negative news, as also implied by the accumulation of negative news.
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Figure 3. News balance (non-cumulated) across tenure, scatterplot with linear fit, Denmark, 1984–2003.
There is a statistically significant difference between the mean news tone during the two
centre-right governments and the single centre-left government in this period (results not
shown). But this difference disappears when controlling for the slight increase in negativity
over time (noticeable in Figure 2). Furthermore, government colour is unrelated to our
dependent variable of interest – the change in vote intention for governing parties – and we
find no significant interaction between news tone and government colour when explaining
government support in the polls. We have, therefore, not included government colour in
the analyses below. Future work (i.e., comparative studies that cover more cabinets) should
hopefully have enough degrees of freedom to investigate potential differences between
cabinets.
Figure 3 does not provide support for our first potential alternative explanation of
the cost-of-ruling phenomenon – namely that the month-to-month news balance simply
becomes more negative with tenure.When examining the news balance-tenure relationship,
there is no clear pattern (Pearson’s R of –0.05, not statistically significant). Consequently,
the linear fit between tenure and month-to-month news balance is nearly flat.
Defining length of tenure comes with some challenges as what constitutes a new
government is not beyond discussion. In the following, we define a ‘shift of government’
as when power shifts from one bloc of parties to another. In practice, in the period under
investigation, this implies that a shift of government requires a new prime minister and
a new prime ministerial party. It does not count as a change in government when the
C© 2019TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
COST OF RULING AS A GAME OF TONES 13
Figure 4. Government support across tenure, scatterplot with linear fit, Denmark, 1984–2003.
same government continues after an election or when a small party leaves or enters the
ruling coalition. The argument behind this operationalisation is that the colour of the
government and the prime minister is what voters see as the most important traits of a
Danish government. Based on this definition, the period under investigation has seen three
governments: the centre-right government of Conservative Poul Schlüter in 1982–1993; the
centre-left government of Social Democrat Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in 1993–2001; and the
centre-right government of Liberal Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2001–2009.
More particularly, the variable that identifies length of tenure in our models is measured
as the number of months a government has occupied office. In those instances where a
government continues after an election, the tenure variable keeps counting the months in
office. Plotting vote intention for government against the length of tenure, Figure 4 shows
that there is in fact a cost of ruling in the data used for the following analyses. Support
declines steadily as tenure increases, and the linear prediction plot is fit with an R2 of 0.41.
Control variables
It is well-established that a weak economy may lower support for the incumbent
government. The effect of economic conditions on government support is measured
using the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Composite Leading
Indicator (CLI), which builds on a wide range of key, short-term economic indicators.8
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The CLI is a times-series consisting of several indicators revealing a consistent relationship
with a reference series (e.g., industrial production, gross domestic product) at turning points.
It provides qualitative information on short-term economic movements, especially at the
turning points, meaning that its main message is the increase or decrease rather than the
amplitude of the changes.
To control for the change in government support caused by parties entering or leaving
the government coalition between elections, we include a dummy variable identifying such
events.Furthermore, in theDanish case, the over-time decline in support for the government
shown inFigure 3 is also found in elections results.Thesen (2016) shows that the cost of ruling
in Danish elections from 1981 to 2014 totals 2.1 percentage points on the government level
and 0.8 percentage points per governing party. Finally, to account for the cyclical patterns
identified in the literature on VP functions, we distinguish campaigns and honeymoon
periods using two dummy variables that are given the value 1 in, respectively, the month
of the election and the month prior to election (campaign); and the three months following
the month of the election (honeymoon).9
Statistical model specification
We test our argument using a series of error correction models, which have been chosen
for several reasons. First, the central variables in the analysis are non-stationary. That
government support trends downwards over time is exactly what cost-of-ruling theory
predicts and is empirically corroborated by Figure 4 and additional tests based on
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller approach (see Table A3 in the Online Appendix). By
construction, the tenure variable has a deterministic time trendwith breaks for thosemonths
where the government shifts from one bloc of parties to the other. Given the systematic
overweight of negative news, the cumulated measure of news coverage clearly follows a
stochastic trend over time with breaks similar to the tenure variable (see Figure 2 and test
statistics reported in Table A3 in the Online Appendix).
In fact, Engle-Granger co-integration tests indicate that the series are co-integrated,
meaning that a long-run equilibrium may exist between the series and deviations from
this equilibrium are stationary. Though the application of the error correction model is not
restricted to the study of co-integrated series, it is a recommended and standard solution in
this case (see De Boef & Keele 2008). When studying the cost of ruling, we are dealing
with phenomena that are unusually invariant: governments lose support and negative
news outweighs positive news. This results in closely matching trends, which complicates
the attempts at causal modelling; however, applying an error correction model where the
dependent variable has been first-differenced alleviates these concerns.
An additional advantage of the error correction model is the ability to estimate both
short- and long-run effects, which is attractive given that theory does not provide guidance
on how quickly voter support may respond to media coverage. Furthermore, the inclusion
of differenced time-series (month-to-month changes) reduces the noise that may stem from
changes in government compositions, where a party may either enter or leave a coalition
without provoking the election of a new government. Given that we measure government
support as the sum of vote intentions for the parties in government, such changes in the
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government coalition may automatically influence the level of support for government
parties but not necessarily the month-to-month changes in government support.
The error correction model has the following generic form:
Yt = α0 + α1 ∗ Yt−1 + β0 ∗ Xj,t + β1 ∗ Xj,t−1 + εt (1)
Where yt in this case represents change in government support from one month to the
next, X is a vector of the explanatory variables discussed above, with subscript j referring to
the particular explanatory variable, α0 is the intercept, α1 is the so-called ‘error correction
rate’ and ε is the disturbance term. The immediate, short-term impact of news would be
given by the coefficient of the first-differenced variable (β0) and by the coefficient of the
lagged minus the first-differenced variable (β1 – β0). The long-run multiplier (LRM) is an
important quantity of the error correction model, allowing us to estimate the total effect
of X distributed over future time periods. LRM is calculated by dividing the coefficient
of the lagged variable (β1) by the error correction rate, which is the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable measured as levels – that is, β1/α1. To estimate long-run effects,
the LRM could then be multiplied with any given change in the value of X. In line with
most applications of the error correction model, we do not difference the dummy variables
discussed above.
Findings
Table 1 presents our main findings. The stepwise modelling procedure reflects our attempt
to explore the cost of ruling by examining the relationships between incumbent support,
length of tenure and cumulated news tone. The logic is that if the relationship between
tenure and government support disappears when introducing the cumulated news balance
variables, then this suggests that the relationship between tenure and government support
is (at least partly) due to cumulated news balance. Thus, we begin by establishing the well-
known negative effect of tenure on government support in model 1 before adding our news
tone variable. In model 2 we then add the news tone variable to see whether: (1) there is an
effect of news tone on vote intention for governing parties; and (2) if the inclusion of media
coverage reduces/removes the direct effect of tenure.
The results provide positive answers to both of these questions,as elaborated upon below,
indicating support for the argument that the accumulation of bad news is an important
explanation of the cost-of-ruling phenomenon. In model 2 in Table 1, we see that the lagged
dependent variable is negative and statistically significant, which indicates how the error
correction model as expected captures disruptions to the equilibrium relationship between
government support and our explanatory variables.The process of re-equilibration,whereby
government support is adjusted as a result of, for instance, a higher level of cumulated news
negativity, is not immediate but occurs over future time periods at a rate dictated by the
lagged dependent variable. The largest part of the movement in voter support will occur in
the first month, where nearly 25 per cent (0.244) of the shift will take place, while the rest
manifests itself gradually over the following months.
The cumulated news tone balance is of greater theoretical interest to us, however, and
we will present the results from the perspective of the two questions above. First, we do
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Table 1. Error correction model explaining vote intention for government, monthly data, Denmark, 1984–
2003
(1) (2) (3)
Vote intention governing partiest-1 –0.164*** –0.244** –0.220**
(0.00997) (0.0388) (0.0371)




 Economy 0.283 –0.0894
(0.570) (0.525)
Honeymoon period (3 months) –0.0344 0.0637
(0.0655) (0.196)
Campaign month 0.204 0.442
(0.736) (0.926)
Decrease in governing parties –1.202* –1.161**
(0.329) (0.222)
Cumulated news tone balancet-1 –0.000487** –0.000510***
(0.000100) (0.0000318)
 Cumulated news tone balance –0.00229 –0.000245
(0.000936) (0.000516)
Constant –15.74 –8.468 9.193**
(7.281) (6.868) (1.452)
Observations 237 237 237
Adjusted R2 0.104 0.136 0.107
Notes: Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Dependent
variable is  vote intention for governing parties.
find that news tone affects government support. This does not stem from any immediate
or short-run effect, as the coefficient of the first differenced cumulated news variable is
statistically insignificant. However, the lagged cumulated news variable is clearly significant
and negatively signed as expected. These results provide support for our accumulation
expectation and at the same timeweaken the second alternative explanation from the theory
section: that the cost of ruling is simply a result of month-to-month changes in the tone of
the news.10
Interpreting the long-term effect involves calculating the LRM, which we find is –0.002
(lagged coefficient/lagged dependent variable = 0.000487/0.244 = 0.002). This means that
for two governments with the same length of tenure and similar economic conditions, a
difference in the cumulated news tone balance of 455 (one-third of a standard deviation)
will eventually increase the gap in their support levels by nearly 1 percentage point (0.91).
Admittedly, a large part of this effect – 0.22 percentage points, corresponding to the error
correction rate of nearly 25 per cent (0.91 × 0.244) – manifests itself in the first month.
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A standard deviation rise in cumulated negative news, a sizeable but still not extreme
increase, adds up to a 2.7 percentage point drop in government support.
In model 1 in Table 1, we notice the expected negatively signed effect of government
tenure, clearly corroborating the basic expectation derived from the cost-of-ruling literature.
After controlling for economic developments and government support in the previous
month, Danish governments lose a quarter of a percentage point for every two years
they are in power. Moving on to model 2 in Table 1, the first thing to notice is that this
effect vanishes. The inclusion of the cumulated media variable leaves the tenure coefficient
substantially lower and statistically insignificant. We interpret this as a sign of mediation;
or, more precisely, as a specification of why increased tenure reduces government support:
because negative news images accumulate over time.
Keep in mind that the results are obtained while taking into account the autoregressive
component in government support, economic developments and other control variables. A
closer look at the coefficient of the economic variable reveals a positive and statistically
significant effect, as the literature on the economic vote and VP functions would predict.
The estimated effects of the ‘Honeymoon’ and ‘Campaign’ variables are insignificant, while
a reduction in the number of governing parties has the expected negative effect.11 More
relevant from the perspective of our research question is the fact that the inclusion of control
variables does not substantially alter the estimated effect of news tone on vote intention for
governing parties.As can be witnessed inmodel 3 in Table 1, the cumulated news asymmetry
effect is just marginally stronger in a reduced model containing only the autoregressive
term.
Diagnostic tests revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test, p > 0.0074), and, thus, the models reported above use clustered standard
errors. Furthermore, a leverage-versus-residual squared plot showed that four observations
have high leverage but very small residuals (indicating that they do not bias the estimate),
and four observations have high residuals but very low leverage (indicating that they have
very little influence on the overall regression estimates).12
We have run several additional models to test the robustness of the models reported
above. Table A4 in the Online Appendix illustrates that our findings on the accumulated
news grievances mechanism are stable across different specifications. In the first model, we
have operationalised the cumulated news effect in an alternative way in order to reduce
the trend in this variable. We do so by accumulating the ratio of negative to positive
news – ameasure which is not by default linked to the total number of news stories in a given
month.
In the second and third models in Table A4 in the Online Appendix, we drop the
autoregressive component and identify the news accumulation effect using level of (instead
of changes in) government vote intention as the dependent variable. The fourth model in
Table A4 tests an operationalisation of the cumulated news tone balance, where distant
news is de-emphasised at the expense of greater weight on the last 12 months. Specifically,
this is related to discussions in the field of retrospective economic voting, where recent
experiments find that voters substitute the end (i.e., election-year) for the whole (i.e., full
term) (Healy & Lenz 2014). In line with these findings, we see that the cumulated news
effect is in fact stronger when accounting for the so-called ‘end heuristics’. The fifth model in
Table A4 evaluates our third alternative explanation for the news-driven cost-of-ruling
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effect: that news tone simply has a stronger impact on government support as tenure
increases. This translates to an interaction effect between month-to-month news balance
(equal to the first-differenced cumulated news balance) and tenure, which does not receive
support in our models. Finally, model 6 in Table A4 illustrates how the main results of the
article are reproduced when using unemployment instead of economic developments as a
control variable.
Conclusion
We have argued that news content, by providing voters with a constant stream of negative
images from the point of view of government, offers a plausible answer to the question
of why ‘winners are losers’. Studying the relationship between the asymmetric news tone
and vote intention for incumbents on a monthly basis over 20 years in Denmark, we find
support for this claim. While there is no indication of a short-run news tone effect, where
changes in news negativity from one month to the next affect government support, there
is a long-run equilibrium between government support and cumulated news images; and
when negativity accumulates, government support gradually readjusts to a lower level.Thus,
there is strong evidence to support the main argument of the article: that news negativity
accumulates during incumbency, thereby pushing away a steadily increasing number of
voters.
The theoretical perspectives and empirical results fit nicely into existing research,making
use of previously untested assumptions. Other studies have hinted at the role of news
media but have not developed or tested the argument. The most elaborate studies come
from the literature on vote and popularity functions, but this literature only focuses on the
economy, not the entire issue agenda. Yet with its focus on cyclical patterns in government
support, it does point to questions that would be highly relevant to investigate further.
One would be the role of election campaigns. This article has argued that the cost of
ruling is the result of what happens between elections. An open question is whether
election campaigns systematically dampen or increase the losses that the government
has incurred since the last election. In our view, this research track is worth pursuing
further.
Furthermore, we have only examined one country. Although we argue that our
assumptions and explanations are general in scope,matching the near universal existence of
governing costs as well as the negative and critical character of political news in democratic
societies, comparative approaches are obviously needed to assess this. In the above, we
pointed to Denmark being a relatively hard case for identifying the cost of ruling as
factors such as minority governments and decentralisation blur the clarity of responsibility.
Yet there is an obvious need for more comparative work on the cost of ruling. Having
identified a basic mechanism – cumulated negative news coverage – provides a better
theoretical underpinning for comparative work. We need to understand how different
political institutions affect this mechanism. Although there are similarities between two-
party systems and bloc-based competition in a multiparty system, studies consistently find
that voter movements vary across electoral systems (cf. Dassonneville & Hooghe 2011).
Even within a multiparty context, different practices of executive power-sharing matter. For
instance, Hjermitslev (2018) recently showed that junior partners in coalition governments
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are particularly hit by the cost of ruling. This raises important questions about how voters
attribute negative news to different coalition partners.
Another comparative question relates to different media systems. As argued above,
Denmark is an example of the corporatist media system, and the Danish radio news was a
good proxy for the entire media agenda in the period studied.However, the media dynamics
might be quite different in the countries of southern Europe, for instance, where political
parallelism is stronger and public broadcasters have been found to report in less negative
ways (Esser et al. 2017: 89). Based on the findings of this article, such differences are likely
to affect the cost of ruling.
Furthermore, recent developments in media landscapes also raise broader questions
about the future outlook of news influence on incumbent support. As argued by Green-
Pedersen et al. (2017), the negative focus in the news, from a government perspective, is
tightly linked to the idea of critical journalism. In other words, the development of news
institutions, news values and the journalistic role will likely affect the extent to which news
content exhibits a negativity bias from the perspective of governing parties. Time has passed
since the end of our period of investigation.Meanwhile, social media and online news have
rapidly changed media landscapes. Although traditional news sources are still important
agenda-setters, it is nevertheless an open question how these changes will impact the way
in which news affects the cost of ruling. To the extent that the critical journalism generating
a negative news tone from an incumbent perspective is under pressure, costs of governing
might look different in the near future.
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Additional information and analysis may be found online in the Online Appendix at the
end of the article:
Table A1. Examples of positive, negative and neutral news stories
Table A2. Descriptives of news tone (positive, negative, neutral and uncodeable stories)
TableA3.Fisher-type unit-root test (trend included).Null hypothesis: all panels contain unit
roots
Table A4. Alternative specifications of the news accumulation effect. Model 1, 4 and 5: DV
is  vote intention; Model 2 and 3: DV is vote intention
Figure A1. Number of radio news stories across time, scatterplot with linear prediction,
Denmark, 1984-2003
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Notes
1. By implication, the winning majorities could not be identical either. In theory, this poses the question as
to whether the increasing coalition of minorities is neutralised by an increasing coalition of majorities.
The grievance asymmetry theory (see below) would provide a way around this, making sure that
although many groups have been part of both losing and winning coalitions, they are more likely to
emphasise the experiences from the former.
2. Data kindly made available by Jacob Askham-Christensen.
3. In two elections, there was little overall movement during the campaign. In two other elections, the
governing parties lost support during the campaign. In three elections, they managed to increase their
support in the final weeks.
4. Full manuscripts have never existed. The speakers on the radio news had short summaries on which
basis they presented the news stories. The coding was based on these summaries, provided by the DR’s
archive. Typically, the summaries were 3–4 lines long.
5. Two student coders coded the news tone. Test of intercoder reliability was performed both before and
after the coding, and average values of Krippendorf Alpha were around 0.73, which is satisfactory given
the complexity involved in the coding. See Thesen et al. (2016) for more details. Because of the format
of the news data material, the coders could not be assigned news items completely randomly. In order
to alleviate the concern that the differences that always exist between coders are distributed unevenly,
we include a dummy variable (not reported) distinguishing between the two coders.
6. There are obvious limits to this link,which is also why there are numerous ‘neutral’ stories in our dataset
that would have been coded as good/bad in alternative approaches. For instance, isolated events in
the private sector that most people would consider negative/positive in themselves are only politically
negative/positive if they hold (or are framed as holding) general implications. Think of the difference
between a story about one business struggling with their web security (neutral), and a story about a
general threat to web security in the banking sector (negative).
7. A related assumption, which we are not able to address in this study, concerns whether incumbents
receive more negative coverage than others. However, previous studies have shown that news is overall
negative from an incumbent perspective with any combination of government and opposition news
presence (Green-Pedersen et al. 2017).
8. See https://data.oecd.org/leadind/composite-leading-indicator-cli.htm for details.
9. In their examination of ‘honeymoons’ across 20 countries,Green and Jennings (2016: 181) estimate that
it takes 3.4 months for a governing party’s support to fall below the election level.
10. Note that the month-to-month changes in the news tone balance equal the first differenced cumulated
news balance series.
11. Additionally, specifications with squared time counters (for both tenure and the electoral cycle) show
no traces of a cyclical pattern in government support. However, there is a statistically significant but
shorter honeymoon effect of two months in the data (results not shown).
12. Running a model where these observations are excluded does not change the results.
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